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Abstract. This note is an extended review of the book Error and Inference, edited by Deborah
Mayo and Aris Spanos, about their frequentist and philosophical perspective on testing of hypothesis
and on the criticisms of alternatives like the Bayesian approach.
1. Introduction.
“The philosophy of science offer valuable tools for understanding and ad-
vancing solutions to the problems of evidence and inference in practice”—
D. Mayo and A. Spanos, p.xiv, Error and Inference, 2010
This philosophy book, Error and Inference, whose subtitle is “Recent exchanges
on experimental reasoning, reliability, and the objectivity and rationality of Science”,
includes contributions by P. Achinstein, A. Chalmers, D. Cox, C. Glymour, L. Laudan,
A. Musgrave, and J. Worrall, and by both editors, D. Mayo and A. Spanos. It
offers reflections on the nature of testing and the defence of the “Error-Statistical
philosophy”, proposed by Mayo (1996). Error and Inference is the edited continuation
of a conference held at Virginia Tech in 2006, ERROR 06. Given my layman interest in
the philosophy of Science, I find that the book reads rather well, despite my missing
references in the field. (Paradoxically, the sections I found the hardest to follow
were those most centred on Statistics.) The volume is very carefully edited and thus
much more than a collection of papers, thanks to the dedications of the editors. In
particular, Deborah Mayo added her comments at the end of the chapters of all
contributors (but her own’s and Aris Spanos’). Her strongly frequentist perspective
on the issues of testing and model choice are thus reflected in the tone of the volume,
even though some contributors bring some level of (un-Bayesian) contradiction to the
debate. My own Bayesian arguments following from reading Error and Inference are
provided in the following sections, ordered by book chapters. A broader and deeper
philosophico-statistical perspective on the nature of Bayesian inference to which I
mostly subscribe are given by Berger (2003) and Gelman and Shalizi (2012).
2. Severe testing.
“However, scientists wish to resist relativistic, fuzzy, or post-modern turns
(...) Notably, the Popperian requirement that our theories are testable and
falsifiable is widely regarded to contain important insights about respon-
sible science and objectivity.”— D. Mayo and A. Spanos, p.2, Error and
Inference, 2010
As illustrated by the above quote (which first part I obviously endorse), the
overall perspective in the book is Popperian, despite Popper’s criticism of statistical
inference as a whole and of Bayesian statistics as a particular (see the quote at the
top of Section 5.1). Another fundamental concept throughout the book is the “Error-
Statistical philosophy” whose Deborah Mayo is the proponent (Mayo, 1996). One of
the tenets of this philosophy is a reliance on statistical significance tests in the fusion
Fisher-Neyman-Pearson (or self-labelled frequentist) tradition, along with a severity
1
2principle (“We want hypotheses that will allow for stringent testing so that if they
pass we have evidence of a genuine experimental effect”, p.19) stated as (p.22)
A hypothesis H passes a severe test T with data x if
1. x agrees with H, and
2. with very high probability, test T would have produced a result
that accords less well with H than does x, if H were false or
incorrect.
The p-value is advanced as a direct accomplishment of this goal, but I fail to see why
it does or, if it does, then why a Bayes factor (Jeffreys, 1939) would not. Indeed,
the criterion depends on the definition of the probability model when H is false or
incorrect. This somehow reflects negatively Mayo’s criticism of the Bayesian approach,
as explained below. In particular, the “high probability” assumes a lack of contiguity
between the tested hypothesis H and its negative ¬H , that is unrealistic even within
the perspective of the book, as is the claim below. (See also Spanos’ required “highly
improbable” good fit to the model defined by H “were H to be in error”, p.209.)
“Formal error-statistical tests provide tools to ensure that errors will be
correctly detected with high probabilities.” — D. Mayo, p.33, Error and
Inference, 2010
In Chapter 1 (Learning from error, severe testing, and the growth of theoretical
knowledge), Deborah Mayo address a frontal attack against the Bayesian approach.
The main criticism therein is about the Bayesian approach to testing (restrictedly
defined through the posterior probability of the hypothesis, rather than through the
predictive) is about the “catchall hypothesis”, a somehow desultory term replacing
the more standard “alternative” hypothesis. According to Mayo, this alternative
hypothesis should “include all possible rivals, including those not even though of”
(p.37). This sounds to me like a weak argument, given that
1. the argument should also apply in the frequentist case, in order to define the
relevant probability distribution “when H is false or incorrect” (see, e.g., the
above quote and also the one about the “probability of so good an agreement
(between H and x) calculated under the assumption that H is false”, p.40);
2. it is reasonable to argue that a well-defined alternative should always be
available given testing an hypothesis is very rarely the ultimate goal of a
study: if H is rejected, there should be a available alternative model for
conducting the analysis of the available data, to be picked or constructed
precisely among those “thought of”;
3. the argument about the infinite set of possible rivals is self-defeating in that
it leads to the fallacy of the perfect model: given a dataset, there always is a
model that fits perfectly this dataset;
4. rejecting or accepting an hypothesis H in terms of the sole null hypothe-
sis H does not make sense from operational as well as from game-theoretic
(DeGroot, 1970) perspectives.
A further argument found in this chapter that the posterior probability ofH is a direct
function of the prior probability of H does not stand when used against the Bayes fac-
tor. (The same lack of justification applies to the criticism that the Bayesian approach
does not accommodate newcomers, i.e., new alternatives, since marginal likelihoods
are computed separately for each potential model, Kass and Raftery, 1995.) Stat-
ing that “one cannot vouch for the reliability of [this Bayesian] procedure—that it
would rarely affirm theory T were T false” (p.37) completely ignores the wealth of re-
sults about the consistency of the Bayes factor (Schervish, 1995, Berger et al., 2003,
3Moreno et al., 2010), since the “asymptotic long run” (p.20) matters in the Error-
Statistical philosophy. The final argument that Bayesians rank “theories that fit the
data equally well (i.e., have identical likelihoods)” (p.38) does not account for—or
dismisses, see page 50 referring to Jeffreys and Berger instead of Berger and Jefferys
(1992)—the fact that Bayes factors are automated Occam’s razors in that the aver-
aging of the likelihoods over spaces of different dimensions are natural advocates of
simpler models (MacKay, 2002). Even though I discuss this issue in the following sec-
tion, Mayo also seems to imply there that Bayesians are using the data twice (this is at
least how I interpret the insistence on “same” p. 50), which is a sin [genuine] Bayesian
analysis can hardly be found guilty of! Overall, the undercurrents of those criticisms
is similar to the ones found in the recent attacks of Templeton (2008, 2010), later re-
buked in, e.g., Beaumont et al. (2010), about apparently the approximative Bayesian
calculation methods but in truth directed to the overall Bayesian handling of testing
of hypotheses.
3. Theory confirmation and model evidence (Chapter 4).
“Taking the simple case where the background principles specify a finite
list of alternatives T1, . . . , Tn, each piece of data falsifies some Ti until
we are left with just one theory Tj—which (...) is thus ‘deduced from the
phenomenon’.’” — J. Worrall, p.134, Error and Inference, 2010
The fourth chapter of Error and Inference, written by John Worrall, covers the
highly interesting issue of “using the data twice”. The point has been debated many
times in the Bayesian literature and this is one of the main criticisms raised against
Aitkin’s (2010) integrated likelihood. Worrall’s perspective is both related and unre-
lated to this purely statistical issue, when he considers that “you can’t use the same
fact twice, once in the construction of a theory and then again in its support” (p.129).
(He even signed a “UN Charter”, where UN stands for “use novelty”!) After reading
both Worrall’s and Mayo’s viewpoints, the later being that all that matters is severe
testing as it encompasses the UN perspective, I afraid I am none the wiser about the
relevance of their arguments from a statistical perspective, but this led me to reflect
on the statistical issue.1
From first principles, a Bayesian approach should only use the data once, namely
when constructing the posterior distribution on every unknown component of the
model(s). Given this all-encompassing posterior, all inferential aspects are the conse-
quences of a sequence of decision-theoretic steps in order to select optimal procedures.
This is the ideal setting while, in practice, relying on a sequence of posterior distri-
butions is often necessary, each posterior being a consequence of earlier decisions,
which makes it the result of a multiple use of the data... For instance, the process
of Bayesian variable selection is on principle clean from the sin of “using the data
twice”: one simply computes the posterior probability of each of the variable subsets
and this is over. However, in a case involving many (many) variables, there are two
difficulties: one is about building the prior distributions for all possible models, a
task that needs to be automatised to some extent; another is about exploring the
set of potential models, e.g., resorting to projection priors as in the intrinsic solution
of Pe´rez and Berger (2002), while unavoidable and a “least worst” solution, means
switching priors/posteriors based on earlier acceptances/rejections, i.e. on the data.
1However, the UN principle seems much too mechanical when considering the quote from John
Worrall: ticking models away by using one observation at a time is certainly not a sound statisti-
cal procedure, even though sufficient and testing statistics may vary from one model to the next
(Robert et al., 2011).
4Second, the path of models truly explored [which will be a minuscule subset of the
set of all models] will depend on the models rejected so far, either when relying on
a stepwise exploration or when using a random walk MCMC algorithm. Although
this is not crystal clear (there actually is plenty of room for arguing the opposite!), it
could be argued that the data is thus used several times in this process...
“Although the [data] set as a whole both fixes parameter values and (un-
conditionally) supports, no particular element of the data set does both.”—
J. Worrall, p.140, Error and Inference, 2010
One paragraph in Worrall’s chapter intersects with the previous discussion, while
getting away from the “using the data twice” discussion. It compares two theories with
a different number of “free” parameters, hence (seemingly) getting different amounts
of support from a given dataset (“n lots of confirmation [versus] n− r lots”, p.140).
The distinction sounds too arithmetic in that the algebraic dimension of a parameter
may be only indirectly related to its information dimension, as illustrated by DIC
(Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), although this criterion does indeed use the data twice.
Furthermore, a notion like the fractional Bayes factor (O’Hagan, 1995) shows that
the whole dataset may contribute both to the model selection and to the parameter
estimation without the above dichotomy to occur.
4. Theory testing in economics and the error-statistical perspective
(Chapter 6).
“Statistical knowledge is independent of high-level theories.” — A. Spanos,
p.242, Error and Inference, 2010
The sixth chapter of Error and Inference is written by Aris Spanos and deals with
the issues of testing in econometrics (rather than economics). It provides on the one
hand a fairly interesting entry in the history of economics and the resistance to data-
backed theories, primarily because the buffers between data and theory are multifold
(“huge gap between economic theories and the available observational data“, p.203).
On the other hand, what I fail to understand in the chapter (and in other parts of Error
and Inference) is the (local) meaning of theory, as it seems very distinct from what
I would call a (statistical) model. The sentence “statistical knowledge, stemming
from a statistically adequate model allows data to ‘have a voice of its own’s (...)
separate from the theory under scrutiny and its succeeds in securing the frequentist
goal of objectivity in theory testing” (p.206) is puzzling in this respect. (Actually, I
would have liked to see a clear meaning put to this “voice of its own”, as it otherwise
sounds mostly as a catchy sentence...) Similarly, Spanos distinguishes between three
types of models: primary/theoretical, experimental/structural: “the structural model
contains a theory’s substantive subject matter information in light of the available
data” (p.213), data/statistical: “the statistical model is built exclusively using the
information contained in the data” (p.213). I have trouble to understand how testing
can distinguish between those types of models: as a na¨ıve reader, I would have thought
that only the statistical model could be tested by a statistical procedure, even though
I would not call the above a proper definition of a statistical model (esp. since Spanos
writes a few lines below that the statistical model “would embed (nest) the structural
model in its context” (p.213)). The normal example followed on pages 213-217 does
not help [me] to put meaning on this distinction: it simply illustrates the impact
of failing some of the defining assumptions (normality, time homogeneity [in mean
and variance], independence). (As an aside, the discussion about the poor estimation
of the correlation p.214-215 does not help, because it involves a second variable Y
that is not defined for this example.) It would be nice of course if the “noise” in
5a statistical/econometric model could be studied in complete separation from the
structure of this model, however they seem to be irremediably intermingled to prevent
this partition of roles. I thus do not see how the “statistically adequate model is
independent from the substantive information” (p.217), i.e. by which rigorous process
one can isolate the “chance” parts of the data to build and validate a statistical model
per se. The simultaneous equation model (SEM, pp.230-231) is more illuminating of
the distinction set by Spanos between structural and statistical models/parameters,
even though the difference in this case boils down to a question of identifiability.
“What is needed is a methodology of error inquiry that encourages detec-
tion and identification of the different ways an inductive inference could
be in error by applying effective procedures that would detect such errors
when present with very high probability.” — A. Spanos, p.241, Error and
Inference, 2010
The chapter, in line with the book, is strongly entrenched within the “F-N-P”
frequentist paradigm” (p.210). Obviously, there are major differences between the
Fisherian and the Neyman-Pearson approaches to testing that are not addressed in
the chapter, the main opposition being the role (or non-role) of the p-value. The
recurrent (and relevant) worry of Spanos about model misspecification is not directly
addressed by either of those. The extremely strong criticisms of “cookbook” econo-
metrics textbooks (p.233) could thus be equally addressed to most statistics books
and papers: I do not see how the “error statistical perspective” could be able to spot
all departures from model assumptions. Section 6.3 comparing covariate dependent
models a` la Cowles Commission with standard autoregressive models is thus puzzling
because (a) they do not seem particularly comparable to me, for the very reason evac-
uated by Spanos that “ARIMA models ignore all substantive information”, and (b)
time series models may be just as well misspecified. To think that adding a linear
time-dependence to a regression model is sufficient to solve the issues, as argued by
Spanos (“...what distinguishes [this] approach from other more data-oriented tradi-
tions is its persistent emphasis on justifying the methodological foundations of its
procedures using the scientific credentials of frequentist inference“, p.238), is a rather
radical shortcut for a justification of the approach.
5. New perspectives on (some old) problems of frequentist statistics
(Chapter 7).
“The defining feature of an inductive inference is that the premises (evi-
dence statements) can be true while the conclusion inferred may be false
without a logical contradiction: the conclusion is “evidence transcending”.”
— D. Mayo and D. Cox, p.249, Error and Inference, 2010
The seventh chapter of Error and Inference is divided in four parts, written by
David Cox, Deborah Mayo, and Aris Spanos, in different orders and groups of authors.
This is certainly the most statistical of all chapters, not a surprise when considering
that David Cox was involved. Overall, this chapter is crucial by its contribution to
the debate on the nature of statistical testing.
5.1. Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference (Part I).
“The advantage in the modern statistical framework is that the probabili-
ties arise from defining a probability model to represent the phenomenon
of interest. Had Popper made use of the statistical testing ideas being de-
veloped at around the same time, he might have been able to substantiate
his account of falsification.” — D. Mayo and D. Cox, p.251, Error and
Inference, 2010
6The first part of the chapter is Mayo’s and Cox theory of inductive inference. It
was first published in the 2006 Erich Lehmann symposium (Mayo and Cox, 2006).
Contrary to Part II, there is absolutely no attempt there to link nor clash with the
Bayesian approach: this part is focussing on frequentist statistical theory as the sole
basis for inductive inference. The debate therein about deducing that H is correct
from a dataset successfully facing a statistical test is classical (in both senses) but
I stand unmoved by the arguments. The null hypothesis H remains the calibrating
distribution throughout the chapter, with very little (or at least not enough) consid-
eration of what happens when the null hypothesis does not hold. Section 3.6 [of this
part] about confidence intervals being another facet of testing hypotheses is represen-
tative of this perspective. The p-value is defended as the central tool for conducting
hypothesis assessment. (In this version of the paper, some p’s are written in roman
characters and others in italics, which is a wee confusing until one realises that this
is a mere typo!) The fundamental imbalance problem, namely that, in contiguous
hypotheses, a test cannot be expected both to most often reject the null H when it
is [very moderately] false and to most often accept the null H when it is correct is
not discussed there. As stated in the introduction, the argument about substantive
nulls found in Section 3.5 applies to a stylised case of well-separated scientific theories,
however the real world of models is more similar to a grayish (and more Popperian?)
continuum of possibles. In connection with this, I would have expected that the
book addressed on philosophical grounds George Box’s aphorism that “all models are
wrong”. Indeed, one (both philosophical and methodological) difficulty with both the
p-values and the frequentist evidence principle (FEV) is that they rely on the strongly
restrictive belief that one given model can be exact or true (while criticising the sub-
jectivity of the prior modelling in the Bayesian approach). Even in the typology of
types of null hypotheses drawn by the authors in Section 3, the “possibility of model
misspecification” is addressed in terms of the low power of an omnibus test, while
agreeing that “an incomplete probability specification” is unavoidable. An argument
found at several place in Error and Inference is that the alternative to H cannot be
completely specified, an argument going against the second part of Box’s aphorism
that “some models are more useful than others”.
“Sometimes we can find evidence for H0, understood as an assertion that
a particular discrepancy, flaw, or error is absent, and we can do this by
means of tests that, with high probability, would have reported a discrepancy
had one been present.”— D. Mayo and D. Cox, p.255, Error and Inference,
2010
The above quote relates to the Failure and Confirmation section where the authors
try to push the argument in favour of frequentist tests one step further, namely that
that “moderate p-values” may sometimes be used as confirmation of the null. (I
may have misunderstood, the end of the section appearing as a defence of a purely
frequentist—as in repeated experiments—interpretation. This reproduces an earlier
argument about the nature of probability found in Section 1.2, as characterising the
“stability of relative frequencies of results of repeated trials”.)
As an aside, this chapter made me ponder afresh about the nature of probability,
a debate that put me off so much in Keynes (1920) and even in Jeffreys (1939) (see
Robert et al., 2009, Robert, 2010). From a mathematical formal perspective, there is
only one “kind” of probability, the one defined via a reference measure and a prob-
ability, whether it applies to observations or to parameters. From a philosophical
perspective, there is a natural issue about the “truth” or “realism” of the probability
7quantities and of the probabilistic statements. Error and Inference and in particular
this chapter consider that a truthful probability statement is the one agreeing with “a
hypothetical long-run of repeated sampling, an error probability”, while the statistical
inference school of Keynes (1921), Jeffreys (1939), and Carnap (1952) “involves quan-
tifying a degree of support or confirmation in claims or hypotheses”, which makes this
(Bayesian) approach sound less realistic. Obviously, I have no ambition to solve this
long-standing debate, however I see no reason in the first approach to be more realis-
tic by being grounded on stable relative frequencies a` la von Mises (1957). If nothing
else, the notion that a test should be evaluated on its long run performances is very
idealised as the concept relies on an ever-repeating and infinite sequence of identical
trials. Relying on probability measures as self-coherent mathematical measures of
uncertainty carries (for me) as much (or as little) reality as the above infinite experi-
ment. Now, the paper is not completely entrenched in this interpretation, e.g. when
it concludes that “what makes the kind of hypothetical reasoning relevant to the case
at hand is not the long-run low error rates associated with using the tool (or test)
in this manner; it is rather what those error rates reveal about the data generating
source or phenomenon” (p.273).
“If the data are so extensive that accordance with the null hypothesis implies
the absence of an effect of practical importance, and a reasonably high p-
value is achieved, then it may be taken as evidence of the absence of an
effect of practical importance.”— D. Mayo and D. Cox, p.263, Error and
Inference, 2010
The paper discusses on several occurrences conclusions to be drawn from a p-
value near one, as in the above quote. This is an interpretation that does not sit
well with my (and others’, e.g. Hwang et al., 1992) understanding of p-values being
distributed as uniforms under the null: very high p-values should be as suspicious as
very low p-values. (The criticism is not new, of course, see Jeffreys, 1939.) Unless one
does not strictly adhere to the null model, which brings back the above issue of the
approximativeness of any model. I also found fascinating to read the criticism that
“power appertains to a prespecified rejection region, not to the specific data under
analysis” as I thought this equally applied to the p-values, turning “the specific data
under analysis” into a departure event of a prespecified kind. (And leading to the
famous aphorism by Jeffreys, 1939, about an “hypothesis that may be true may be
rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not occurred”.)
5.2. Objectivity and conditionality in frequentist inference (Part II).
“Frequentist methods achieve an objective connection to hypotheses about
the data-generating process by being constrained and calibrated by the method’s
error probabilities in relation to these models .”—D. Cox and D. Mayo,
p.277, Error and Inference, 2010
The second part of the seventh chapter of Error and Inference, is due to David
Cox and Deborah Mayo. The purpose is clear and the sub-chapter quite readable
from a statistician’s perspective. I however find it difficult to quantify objectivity by
first conditioning on “a statistical model postulated to have generated data”, as again
this assumes the existence of a “true” probability model where “probabilities (...)
are equal or close to the actual relative frequencies”. As earlier stressed by Andrew
Gelman on his blog,
“I don’t think it’s helpful to speak of “objective priors.” As a scientist, I
try to be objective as much as possible, but I think the objectivity comes
in the principle, not the prior itself. A prior distribution—any statistical
8model—reflects information, and the appropriate objective procedure will
depend on what information you have.”Andrew Gelman
This part opposes the likelihood, Bayesian, and frequentist methods, as in what
Gigerenzer (2002) classifies as the “superego, the ego, and the id”. Cox and Mayo
stress from the start that the frequentist approach is (more) objective because it is
based on the sampling distribution of the test. My primary problem with this thesis
is that the “hypothetical long run” (p.282) does not hold in realistic settings. Even
in the event of a reproduction of similar or identical tests, a sequential procedure
exploiting everything that has been observed so far is more efficient than the mere
replication of the same procedure solely based on the current observation.
“Virtually all (...) models are to some extent provisional, which is precisely
what is expected in the building up of knowledge.”—D. Cox and D. Mayo,
p.283, Error and Inference, 2010
The above quote is something I completely agree with, being another phrasing
of George Box’s “all models are wrong”, but this transience of working models is a
good reason in my opinion to account for the possibility of alternative working models
from the start of the statistical analysis. Hence for an inclusion of those models in
the statistical analysis equally from the start. Which leads almost inevitably to a
Bayesian formulation of the testing problem.
“Perhaps the confusion [over the role of sufficient statistics] stems in part
because the various inference schools accept the broad, but not the detailed,
implications of sufficiency.”—D. Cox and D. Mayo, p.286, Error and In-
ference, 2010
The discussion over the sufficiency principle is quite interesting, as always. The
authors propose to solve the confusing opposition between the sufficiency principle
and the frequentist approach by assuming that inference “is relative to the particu-
lar experiment, the type of inference, and the overall statistical approach” (p.287).
This constraint creates a barrier between sampling distributions that avoids the “bi-
nomial versus negative binomial” paradox often advanced in the Bayesian literature
(Berger and Wolpert, 1988). But the authors’ solution is somehow tautological: by
conditioning on the sampling distribution, it avoids the difficulties linked with several
sampling distributions all producing the same likelihood.2 The section (pp.288-289)
is also revealing about the above “objectivity” of the frequentist approach in that the
derivation of a test taking large value away from the null with a well-known distri-
bution under the null is not an automated process, esp. when nuisance parameters
cannot be escaped from (pp.291-294). Achieving separation from nuisance parame-
ters, i.e. finding statistics that can be conditioned upon to eliminate those nuisance
parameters, does not seem feasible outside well-formalised models related with expo-
nential families. Even in such formalised models, a (clear?) element of arbitrariness
is involved in the construction of the separations, which implies that the objectivity is
under clear threat. The chapter recognises this limitation in Section 9.2 (pp.293-294),
however it argues that separation is much more common in the asymptotic sense and
opposes the approach to the Bayesian averaging over the nuisance parameters, which
“may be vitiated by faulty priors” (p.294). I am not convinced by the argument, given
that the (approximate) condition approach amount to replace the unknown nuisance
2From a practical perspective, I have however become less enamoured of the sufficiency principle
as the existence of [non-trivial] sufficient statistics is quite the rare event. Especially across models,
as discussed in Robert et al. (2011).
9parameter by an estimator, without accounting for the variability of this estimator.
Averaging brings the right (in a consistency sense) penalty.
A compelling section is the one about the weak conditionality principle (pp.294-
298), as it objects to the usual statement that a frequency approach breaks this
principle. In a mixture experiment about the same parameter θ, inferences made
conditional on the experiment “are appropriately drawn in terms of the sampling
behaviour in the experiment known to have been performed” (p. 296). This seems
hardly objectionable, as stated. And I must confess the sin of stating the opposite
as The Bayesian Choice has this remark (Robert (2007), Example 1.3.7, p.18) that
the classical confidence interval averages over the experiments. The term experiment
validates the above conditioning in that several experiments could be used to measure
θ, each with a different p-value. I will not argue with this: I could, however, about
“conditioning is warranted to achieve objective frequentist goals” (p. 298) in that
the choice of the conditioning, among other things, weakens the objectivity of the
analysis. In a sense the above pirouette out of the conditioning principle paradox
suffers from the same weakness, namely that when two distributions characterise the
same data (the mixture and the conditional distributions), there is a choice to be
made between “good” and “bad”. Nonetheless, an approach based on the mixture
remains frequentist if non-optimal. (The chapter later attacks the derivation of the
likelihood principle by Birnbaum, 1962 in Part III by Deborah Mayo that will not be
discussed in this paper as it deserves a specific paper.)
“Many seem to regard reference Bayesian theory to be a resting point until
satisfactory subjective or informative priors are available. It is hard to see
how this gives strong support to the reference prior research program.”—
D. Cox and D. Mayo, p.302, Error and Inference, 2010
A section also worth commenting is (unsurprisingly!) the one addressing the
limitations of the Bayesian alternatives (pp.298-302). The authors however dismiss
straight away the personalistic approach to prior construction by considering it fails
the objectivity canons. This seems too hasty to me, since the choice of a prior is
1. the choice of a reference probability measure against which to assess the
information brought by the data, not clearly less objective than picking one
frequentist estimator or another, and
2. a personal construction of the prior can also be defended on objective grounds,
based on the past experience of the modeller. That it varies from one modeller
to the next is not an indication of subjectivity per se, simply of different past
experiences.
Cox and Mayo then focus on reference priors, a` la Bernardo-Berger (1992), once
again pointing out the lack of uniqueness of those priors as a major flaw. While the
sub-chapter agrees on the understanding of those priors as convention or reference
priors, aiming at maximising the information input from the data, it gets stuck on
the impropriety of such priors: “if priors are not probabilities, what then is the
interpretation of a posterior?” (p.299). This seems like a strange (and unfair) comment
to me: the interpretation of a posterior is that it is a probability distribution and this
is the only mathematical constraint one has to impose on a prior. (Which may indeed
be a problem in the derivation of reference priors.) As detailed in The Bayesian Choice
among other books (Hartigan, 1983, Berger, 1985), there are many compelling reasons
to invite improper priors into the game. (And one not to, namely the difficulty with
point null hypotheses.) While I agree that the fact that some reference priors (like
matching priors, whose discussion p.302 escapes me) have good frequentist properties
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is not compelling within a Bayesian framework, it seems a good enough answer to the
more general criticism about the lack of objectivity: in that sense, frequency-validated
reference priors are part of the huge package of frequentist procedures and cannot be
dismissed on the basis of being Bayesian. That reference priors are possibly at odd
with the likelihood principle does not matter so much: the shape of the sampling
distribution is part of the prior information, not of the likelihood per se. The final
argument (Section 12) that Bayesian model choice requires the preliminary derivation
of “the possible departures that might arise” (p.302) has been made at several points
in Error and Inference and already discussed above. Besides being in my opinion a
valid working principle, i.e. selecting the most appropriate albeit false model, this
definition of well-defined alternatives is mimicked by the assumption of “statistics
whose distribution does not depend on the model assumption” (p.302) found in the
same last paragraph.
In conclusion this (sub-)chapter by David Cox and Deborah Mayo is (as could
be expected!) a deep and thorough treatment of the frequentist approach to the suffi-
ciency and (weak) conditionality principle. It however fails to convince me that there
exists a “unique and unambiguous” frequentist approach to all but the most simple
problems. At least, from reading this chapter, I cannot find a working principle that
would lead me to this single unambiguous frequentist procedure.
5.3. Spanos’ comments (Part IV).
“It is refreshing to see Cox and Mayo give a hard-nosed statement of what
scientific objectivity demands of an account of statistics, show how it relates
to frequentist statistics, and contrast that with the notion of “objectivity”
used by O-Bayesians.”—A. Spanos, p.326, Error and Inference, 2010
The discussion by Aris Spanos is an exegesis of Part II by David Cox and Deborah
Mayo: the first point in the discussion is that the above is “a harmonious blend of the
Fisherian and N-P perspectives to weave a coherent frequentist inductive reasoning
anchored firmly on error probabilities”(p.316). The discussion by Spanos being very
much a-critical, I will rather expose here some thoughts of mine that came from
reading this apology. (Remarks about Bayesian inference are limited to some piques
like the above, which only reiterates those found earlier [and later: ”the various
examples Bayesians employ to make their case involve some kind of ”rigging” of the
statistical model”, Aris Spanos, p.325; ”The Bayesian epistemology literature is filled
with shadows and illusions”, Clark Glymour, p. 335] in Error and Inference.)
The “general frequentist principle for inductive reasoning” (p.319) at the core
of Cox and Mayo’s paper is obviously the central role of the p-value in “providing
(strong) evidence against the null H0 (for a discrepancy from H0)”. Once again, I fail
to see it as the epitome of a working principle in that
1. it depends on the choice of a divergence measure d(z), which reduces the
information brought by the data z;
2. it does not articulate the level for labelling nor the consequences of finding a
low p-value;
3. it ignores the role of the alternative hypothesis.
Furthermore, Spanos’ discussion deals with “the fallacy of rejection” (pp.319-320) in
a rather artificial (if common throughout Error and Inference) way, namely by setting
a buffer of discrepancy around the null hypothesis. While the choice of a maximal
degree of precision sounds natural to me (in the sense that a given sample size should
not allow for the discrimination between two arbitrary close values of the parameter),
the fact that γ is in fine set by the data (so that the p-value is high) is fairly puzzling.
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If I do understand correctly, the change from a p-value to a discrepancy γ is a fine
device to make the “distance” from the null better understood, but it has an extremely
limited range of application. If I do not understand correctly, the discrepancy γ is
fixed by the statistician and then this sounds like an extreme form of prior selection.
There is another issue I do not understand in this part, namely the meaning of
the severity evaluation probability
P (d(Z) > d(z0); µ > µ1)
as the conditioning on the range of parameter values seems impossible in a frequentist
setting. This leads me to an idle and unrelated questioning as to whether there is a
solution to
sup
d
PH0(d(Z) ≥ d(z0))
as this would be the ultimate discrepancy γ. Or whether this does not make any
sense, because of the ambiguous role of z0, which somehow needs to be integrated
out. (Otherwise, d can be chosen so that the probability is 1.)
“If one renounces the likelihood, the stopping rule, and the coherence prin-
ciples, marginalizes the use of prior information as largely untrustworthy,
and seek procedures with ‘good’ error probabilistic properties (whatever that
means), what is left to render the inference Bayesian, apart from a belief
(misguided in my view) that the only way to provide an evidential account
of inference is to attach probabilities to hypotheses?”—A. Spanos, p.326,
Error and Inference, 2010
The role of conditioning on ancillary statistics is emphasized both in the paper
and in the discussion. This conditioning clearly reduces variability, however there
is no reservation about the arbitrariness of such ancillary statistics. And the fact
that conditioning any further would lead to conditioning upon the whole data, i.e. to
a Bayesian solution. I also noted a curious lack of proper logical reasoning in the
argument that, when
f(z|θ) ∝ f(z|s)f(s|θ),
using the conditional ancillary distribution is enough, since “any departure from f(z|s)
implies that the overall model is false” (p.322), but not the reverse. Hence, a poor
choice of s may fail to detect a departure. (Besides the fact that fixed-dimension suffi-
cient statistics s do not exist outside exponential families.) Similarly, Spanos expands
about the case of a minimal sufficient statistic that is independent from a maximal
ancillary statistic, but such cases are quite rare and limited to exponential families
[in the iid case]. Plus, the notion of conditional ancilarity is fraught with dangers, as
exposed in Basu (1988). Still in the conditioning category, he also supports Mayo’s
argument against the likelihood principle being a consequence of the sufficiency and
weak conditionality principles. However, he does not provide further evidence against
Birnbaum’s result, arguing rather in favour of a conditional frequentist inference I
have nothing to complain about. (I fail to perceive the appeal of the Welch uniform
example in terms of the likelihood principle.)
6. Conclusion. In a overall recap, let me restate that this note about Error and
Inference is an extended reading note and is thus far from pretending at bringing a
global and definitive Bayesian reply to the philosophical arguments raised in the vol-
ume. Once again, this broader perspective is partly provided by Gelman and Shalizi
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(2012). While the core goal is of “taking some crucial steps towards legitimating
the philosophy of frequentist statistics” (p.328), the debate cannot escape veering at
times towards a comparison with the Bayesian approach, hence generating the above
comments of mine’s. From a more global perspective, reading Error and Inference is
a worthy and fruitful exercise for Bayesians and frequentists alike as most chapters
at least should bring new food for their thoughts on hypothesis testing and model
choice, since those inferential goals are still wide open to improvements and rebuttals
within both approaches.
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